In the nuclear sector, turnkey projects can be considered an investment in obtaining information through "learning by doing" to capture rents from the next generation of reactors. As the first U.S. turnkey export project, the first Spanish nuclear power plant served that purpose and paved the way to the subsequent growth of the nuclear sector, for both Spanish and U.S. firms.
combined a dictatorship (in fact, the only dictatorship among the early nuclear adopters) with a lobbying electricity sector that influenced, without opposition, the decisions of the government and its regulatory agencies. This setting defined how decisions were made in the Spanish case: that is, without checks or balances. 5 The Spanish case fills a gap in the international literature on nuclear programs. There are good accounts of nuclear programs in capitalist democracies (the United States, West Germany, France, and Britain) and in the communist world (the U.S.S.R., East Germany), but Spain represents a distinct case of a Fascist dictatorship that was slowly coming back into the international stage. 6 In the early 1960s, American institutions concluded a decade of efforts in the commercial development of nuclear-powered electric energy with more failures than successes. A massive injection of public funds was made in an attempt to overcome technical difficulties so that experimental reactors could produce marketable electricity. However, none of the prototypes had provided engineering solutions on a large scale. Further, when the industry accomplished this feat at the end of the Eisenhower administration, the resulting solutions were far from economically competitive. At the time, General Electric (GE) and Westinghouse (WH) believed they needed a great deal of new knowledge before profits could arrive. 7 In addition, the space race had taken the spotlight in the new Democratic administration. The scientific community's skepticism suggested a time frame of twenty years before commercial use could be achieved, and they underscored the security risks of the technology. Only the government and the pioneering industries associated with this new technology remained steadfast in their resolve to develop the business. The standing of the Western leadership in its competition with the Soviet Union was at stake. The opportunity to profit from the investment that had already been made also seemed to be far away. In effect, the beginning of international sales of nuclear reactors had been sluggish. From the Atoms for Peace speech until 1964, the United States had sold only seven reactors overseas (see Table 1 ). The British had sold another two. All were experimental reactors.
[ Table 1 about here]
For all of these reasons, at the end of 1962, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) drafted its report to the president with a double objective. The report's primary objective was to persuade the Kennedy administration to increase financial support of the nuclear industry with research funds and subsidies for private businesses to build commercial plants.
Secondarily, the report aimed to create favorable public opinion concerning the civil learning-by-doing exercise for the industry on both sides of the Atlantic, as a process that included learning through new experiences. 16 The experience acquired in Spain by the WH engineering department in the provision of continuous improvements was crucial to its conquest of the world market. 17 In addition, for the Spaniards, Zorita constituted a nuclear training school for technicians and experts, the upgrade of low-tech civil companies to the required quality standards, and the understanding of the inner workings of the international capital markets. As a result, all of those who were involved had much to learn and to gain from the project.
Building the Spanish Nuclear Network
The pursuit of a Spanish nuclear program was hastened after the First International
Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, which convened in Geneva in August
The Spanish version of the nuclear iron triangle was slowly forged between 1956 and
1964, but it only emerged in its definitive shape after 1962 with the decision to leave the construction of nuclear power plants to the private sector, a network that included politicians, technicians, and business groups linked to energy, construction, and civil engineering. 18 The aim of this network was the commercial use of electricity derived from nuclear fission. As in the case of the United States, the roles of policymakers, technocrats, and lobbyists sometimes overlapped: the industry created its own rules that supplanted legislation, and the supervisors maintained a close relationship with the industry they were supposed to oversee. The main difference between the Spanish triangle and the American one is not the intertwined relationships among the people involved, but the lack of checks and counterbalances that existed in the U.S. democracy. In Spain, the initial internal dilemma was focused on the decision of who should lead the atomic program: the market or the state. Economic policy considerations, business decisions, and technical factors finally resolved this stalemate. We will begin by defining each of the three vertices of the iron triangle (see Figure 1 ).
[ Figure 1 about here]
In a dictatorship, the policymakers have absolute power because executive decisions are not subject to parliamentary control or checked by any other balancing authority. The government passed laws and created the institutional framework. In Franco's Spain, the Government Presidency (which coordinated all civil and military actions of the state) and the Department of Industry were the governmental entities that promoted the initial nuclear projects. This was a complicated objective for an ostracized country that was subject to strict controls. The importing of capital goods and technical assistance involved the obtaining of access to international means of payment that were nonexistent in Spain. Finally, the National Industry Institute (INI) originally appeared as the industrial executor of nuclear projects. 19 At these initial stages, some of the personalities within the government unsuccessfully claimed for a more prominent role for the private sector.
In the second vertex, we place the technocrats: specialists and experts in the nuclear sector who defined the technological limits. 20 The Nuclear Energy Board (JEN [Junta de
Energía Nuclear]), created in 1951, became the public entity to which the government entrusted technical decisions regarding nuclear energy. 21 The three fundamental objectives of JEN were to exploit uranium deposits in the country, to establish a scientific system for the new technology-to be determined by the experts-and to create a national industry around atomic energy. The JEN leaders understood that the rapid technological learning to which they aspired involved the establishing of international contacts to facilitate the transfer of know-how. This institutional framework promoted atomic technology and tested it at the laboratory scale in its different applications in health, agriculture, industry, and electricity production. Private initiative played a subsidiary role in autarchic Spain, while policymakers and technocrats dominated the atomic plans.
However, private business groups-the third vertex-refused to play a minor role.
The private sector soon proposed a strategy to occupy a dominant position in the nuclear program in the face of state interventionism. Spanish electricity utilities had had sufficient influence to do so since 1944, when personal links with the dictator allowed the creation of Unidad Eléctrica SA (UNESA)-a cartel of the eighteen largest private electricity firms in the country. Together with the banking sector, the private control of the electricity market constituted an exception within an otherwise interventionist dictatorship. 22 UNESA selfregulated the electricity sector and allotted the country's electricity market among its members. The utilities planning for the upcoming Spanish nuclear market applied the same rules. Consequently, the electricity companies created two business consortia in 1956, one for the northern region of the country and one for the southern region. The utilities clustered to unite their technical and financial possibilities in the face of the atomic challenge and felt that they were prepared to face future electricity requirements on their own. In addition, the 25 Meanwhile, Spanish experts continued to learn firsthand the results of each of the reactors that were tested in North America, Great Britain, Belgium, France, and Italy. 26 The experts found it difficult to make a choice among them given the lack of adequate empirical evidence.
The JEN remained submerged in the economic reasoning of twenty years of autarchy and the model of import substitution industrialization. The starting point of the JEN had been to locate and exploit deposits of uranium. 27 According to the JEN reports, decisions were based the availability of money and the principle of self-sufficiency. This implied that a "country with natural uranium deposits and not an excessively favorable trade balance" must choose reactors that "burn natural uranium" (even if their cost was "slightly more expensive" than that of the enriched minerals, to give preference to "national production"). 28 With the cooperation of Spanish companies and international experts, the JEN formulated an ambitious plan that consisted of research reactors and steel, electrical, and chemical facilities to "achieve the complete nationalization of fuel components manufacturing." 29 The JEN calculated that the first load for a natural-uranium-powered reactor could be achieved between mid-1969 and 1971. 30 Technocrats forecasted that nuclear plants would become competitive in ten years. 31 According to the JEN's selling pitch to banks and financial agents, building a nuclear plant would cost only 18 percent more than a fuel-oil thermal plant by 1960. In light of American, Canadian, and British experiences, the Spanish experts were convinced that this difference would be further reduced by 1969; nuclear energy "would be able to compete economically, in Spanish conditions, with energy generated in conventional thermal plants," which would result in savings for the treasury and the trade balance because they would use domestic fuel. 32 However, engineers and business leaders who worked in the private sector did not endorse that prediction.
While the INI demanded a plan for keeping nuclear projects exclusive to the state, UNESA pushed in the opposite direction. 33 The tension between public and private views surfaced behind closed doors at the JEN council, where the three vertices of the nuclear triangle were represented. At the beginning of 1961, the council sought to evaluate the proposals for the first two atomic plants of the private consortia: Garoña (for the north of the country) and Zorita (for the south). In parallel, the JEN began to develop a state manufactured reactor: the DON (Deuterio-Orgánico-uranio Natural) project. The JEN had convinced the electricity companies to commit 25 percent of the financing for the "made in Spain" reactor. The JEN technical report on the two private projects focused on four aspects that shed light on the Spanish nuclear strategy: (1) how long it would be before the costs of an atomic plant would be smaller than those of other conventional electricity sources; (2) how the most suitable reactor could be selected in terms of availability of local raw materials and the degree of maturity of nuclear technology in the country; (3) where the plants would be installed, in terms of security and water resource needs; and (4) to what extent the adoption of the international regulatory framework would affect the economic viability of the projects. 34 At the JEN council, regarding the report on Garoña, the only dissenting voice belonged to one of the most knowledgeable experts on the electricity market: the president of Iberduero, which was the largest electricity utility at the time and one of the promoters of subordinate the entire project to the new security requirements also troubled him. 37 The president of the JEN provided a vague response: the report on Garoña possessed an "exclusively technical nature," with "the political aspect of the issue" being a matter for the Nuclear Energy General Directorate-that is, the government-and not for the JEN. 38 However, the background was more complicated. The leaders of the two private consortia had exchanged letters with the president of the JEN, thus sidelining the council. The letters made clear that the electricity companies' financial support of the JEN projects was contingent on the approval of their two nuclear plants. 39 At the beginning of 1962, the continuity of the DON project propitiated a "committee for industrial equipment" that, in collaboration with the JEN, would generate "a real nuclear industry in our country" able to supply the Spanish nuclear plants as well as other projects such as Eurochemic and CERN. 40 The JEN had decided for the DON on a thirty-megawatt plant prototype that was moderated with heavy water and refrigerated with organic liquid.
The project would be developed in two stages: the first three years would focus on nuclear research, including the design of the plant, followed by a second stage, without a time frame, for construction. 41 The JEN intended to achieve as much as possible in Spain, even if it required the technical assistance of two American companies: Atomic International (the reactor) and Bechtel Nuclear Corp. (economic consulting).
Given the low technological level that was prevalent in Spain, all of the nuclear projects required international partners and know-how, to be paid for in foreign currency.
Both the private and the public agents would require the consent of the Department of Commerce-which oversaw imports-and that of Instituto Español de Moneda Extranjera (IEME), which undertook strict supervision of foreign currency movements. These two departments presented significant bottlenecks in the race between the public and private nuclear undertakings. Documents exchanged between the general manager of IEME Gregorio López Bravo, the policymaker par excellence in this story) and Tecnatom's CEO (Jaime MacVeigh, the most outstanding lobbyist) resolved one aspect of the enigma of how the private sector managed its way through this situation. The engineer MacVeigh had been considering the idea of privately building a nuclear plant in Spain that would blaze a path for the industry and the electricity market. In a strictly confidential note to López Bravo, MacVeigh provided a summary account about the Spanish program in October 1961. 42 Without preamble, the text offers a critical evaluation of the JEN management and advocates for American technology and private initiative.
MacVeigh maintained that the DON reactor remained precarious, of interest only in the long term, once the complicated problems involving the invention of a prototype could be resolved. He categorically judged that "any foreign prototype requires, before becoming reality, more than $30 million, and five or six years before being able to judge its industrial prospects. In Spain, the time frame will be longer and there are no reasons for it to be less expensive." He was also pessimistic with regard to decisions made in the atomic program thus far: at that rate, "no commercial nuclear plant will start construction before 1966, or later." For these reasons MacVeigh underscored the "convenience of initiating something reasonable from the economic and industrial point of view and in terms of today's feasibility."
While the reference for the JEN was Great Britain (its directors had just visited Calder Hall),
MacVeigh maintained that British plants were "gigantic by design . . . [and] there is no stomach right now in Spain for that capacity (1,000 Mw per year), and no budget (4,000 million pesetas)." In addition, he stated that "it is not true that a greater proportion of the equipment can be built in Spain" for a British type of plant rather than for "another American type, for example, a boiling water type," in a country in which "there is no nuclear industry." 43 MacVeigh uncovered his plans at the end of his confidential message to the policymaker: "it seems convenient to go along with the private proposal . . . to build a small plant, with the maximum collaboration from the JEN, and a capacity of 65Mw, of the boiling water type, and at a reasonable cost, to match the size of current stomachs and budgets." 44 MacVeigh firmly believed that it was necessary for them to accelerate the atomic race-and that this would materialize only with American technology and the leadership of the private sector. He was transmitting to the authorities his own pioneering ideas, which he first put forward in 1957 at the Research Service of the Urquijo Bank and discussed in conferences and public presentations all over Spain. 45 At the end of 1961, these ideas began to take shape as the first private nuclear plant project, Zorita, and in the formation of a nuclear lobby, the Spanish Atomic Forum. MacVeigh correctly forecasted that it all would depend on two The initial size of the Zorita reactor reflected its experimental nature: a prototype of 60 megawatts, for electricity companies to develop civil and industrial capabilities. However, the final version increased power to 153 megawatts, with the intention of adding a second reactor of 300 megawatts. 51 Unión Eléctrica Madrileña (UEM), the provider of electric energy from the capital city, promoted the Zorita project. Madrid and its province experienced a demographic and economic expansion at the time. 52 The construction of hydroelectric facilities and distribution infrastructure almost matched the exponential growth in demand for electricity. 53 Demand would partly determine the location of the first nuclear plant in the country; in addition, the reactor's refrigeration required abundant water. UEM owned several hydroelectric dams around Madrid, and thus, it chose the Zorita reservoir, which was located some ninety-five kilometers from Madrid and had been in operation since EXIM had authorized a single credit for the export of a nuclear plant before the credit for Zorita. 61 In February 1964, EXIM and the UEM agreed on a loan of $24.5 million, to be paid over fifteen years at an interest rate of 5.5 percent: $19 million for equipment and services and $5.5 million to cover the components of the first fuel core (see Table 2 ).
EXIM's loan mostly targeted the purchase of the reactor and equipment (59.5 percent) and the first fuel core (22 percent), which means that technical assistance and services consumed 18.5 percent (including staff training: 2.2 percent of the total). 62 The contract was a historic one: between 1951 and 1962, all the credits from EXIM to the Spanish electricity sector added up to $84.5 million; 63 in other words, Zorita's initial loan represented 30 percent of that total. In financial terms, the atomic program represented a vigorous stimulus for Spanish foreign credits. 64 [ Table 2 about here]
During the first four years-the time frame for the building of the plant-there would be no principal or interest payments on the EXIM credit. However, in addition to the financial advantages, the EXIM credit had complex conditions attached: the promoters had to procure the contracts with the American suppliers (mostly WH) specifying the items, value, and shipping dates for all of the goods to be exported from the United States. Forecasting the shipping dates involved learning about the logistics of transporting large pieces of technology across the globe. 65 Simultaneously, EXIM required the formalization of agreements between the AEC and the Spanish government to enrich Spanish uranium in the United States, although there was no legislation in either country to that effect. The loan's terms detailed the purchasing program for the fuel supply in addition to an inspection plan of the contract through "a specialized American company," Bechtel Co. The UEM agreed to report to EXIM "on the progress of material and construction work and operation of the new plant, as well as any other changes in the process and purchasing periods at the end of each trimester." 66 Finally, EXIM's credit also required formal government approval of the project, which arrived at the end of June 1964. 67 By law, EXIM could finance only the American part of the project; thus, there was a need for parallel private credit. 68 In January 1965 the complementary credit from Chase
Manhattan Bank for $6 million-designated to finance equipment and facilities of Spanish origin (civil works supplies) and foreign services (technical assistance and personnel training)-was obtained. 69 Its conditions stipulated an interest rate of 6.5 percent with an additional rate of 0.5 percent for "commissions from the unforeseen portion." 70 Chase's loan did not require the endorsement of Spanish banks.
Learning to create a nuclear industrial sector. From its beginnings, Zorita
synthesized the idea of learning by doing. The promoters were obliged to gather information and to contact international organizations for the development of atomic energy in Spain.
71
From 1958, they had been "preparing the nuclear technicians overseas." 72 The promoters worked at "acquiring practical experience before starting massive production of nuclear energy." They argued that their experience would benefit the state and other private companies: "it would disseminate knowledge." The project was committed to collaborate with the JEN, high technical standards, its cumulative experience, and all the means at its disposal. 73 Technatom planned to create a training school, which was to be directed by scientists from the JEN and foreign advisors, close to the plant. Part of the foreign financing was needed for the training of personnel who would participate in the installation and operation of the plant, given Spain's inexperience in operating commercial nuclear plants. 74 Approximately fifty-five people would manage the plant, including specialists and auxiliary personnel. 75 In addition, the UEM stated that its "greatest interest [was] in nationalizing as much of the fabrication of equipment and the construction of the plant as possible." 76 This would end up being the learning path for the engineering, industrial, and service companies that participated in the building of Spain's nuclear infrastructure.
The companies involved in the Zorita project were required to innovate in products, techniques, knowledge, and management. Some of these firms were already based in the nuclear business, and others adapted to the new challenges through the diversification of their production lines, strategic alliances with foreign companies, and the implementation of quality controls that had not existed before nuclear plants. 77 Those with experience in the petrochemical or electricity sector, for instance, thought there would be great potential in becoming skilled for the atomic industry. was also a major shareholder in the plant's promoter UEM. 79 The mechanical side was contracted with Montajes Nervión SA, which had provided an entry point to the Spanish market for the French multinational Spie. Meanwhile, one of the largest builders in the country, Entrecanales y Távora, directed the civil works in conjunction with subcontractors from the United States. 80 In practice, Spanish industrial participation in the construction of Zorita accounted for approximately 36 percent of the total costs. 81 These companies evolved into a nuclear industrial cluster, and as of 2016, all of these companies remain prominent players at the international level. The nuclear path proved to be fruitful for the Spanish industry.
[ Table 3 about here]
Learning about the uranium fuel cycle. The engineers who designed the Zorita plant decided to use enriched uranium. They found a solution that reconciled the nationalistic idea of using Spanish minerals while also significantly reducing the cost. 82 Tecnatom held conversations with the AEC, which "had accepted the principle of selling enriched uranium,"
although there was as yet no legislation in that respect (another first). With that information,
the analysis by Spanish engineers ended up being correct in the short and medium term when they predicted that "given the interest of the U.S. in stimulating atomic energy around the world, especially with their technology, there will be no problems" in ensuring the supply of enriched uranium of U.S. manufacture. 83 The engineers trusted that although the first core and the first partial loads would come from America, Spain would in the future develop some of those operations domestically. This idea of transforming uranium initially in America and later in Europe could mean savings of up to 44 percent on the bill to be paid in dollars. They calculated that by the time the second core began to operate, Spanish industries would have the total or partial capability of solving the uranium problem. 84 Ultimately, Spain would never manage to enrich uranium, and as a result, the cost would not be reduced. However, WH, UEM, and the JEN created a joint research program on nuclear fuel, which provided some useful results for the industry worldwide. 85 Further, the model of Spanish uranium enriched in the United States remained in place for a while.
The AEC and UEM split the costs of the uranium cycle. The AEC took care of renting uranium hexafluoride between the initial enrichment and the end of the cycle, the payment for the consumed uranium, and the expenses associated with the reprocessing of fuel components and mineral conversion. Meanwhile, UEM paid for the mining expenses, the mineral treatment and purification, the fabrication of the fuel elements, the transportation, and the insurance. However, the final project multiplied the size of the plant and, consequently, the cost of irradiated fuel loads for the reactor. Increasing the plant size to 153 megawatts multiplied the cost of the first core by a factor of 2.5 (that is, from $4.78 million initially to $28 million for its complete hypothetical life). In practice, the cost continued to increase. Successive reloads of the core continued to depend on American technology at prices that were subject to the volatility of American currency exchange rates, inflation, and rising interest rates. The financial panorama became increasingly complicated.
Other lessons learned (or not).
Once construction began, in the summer of 1965, the Zorita plant was built in record time. At the beginning of 1969, the plant was connected to the grid, and it began the commercial production of electricity. 86 Publicity events, from the inaugural act of the plant until its commercial hook-up, involved different visits from the dictator, the future Spanish king, diplomatic representatives from the United States, bankers, business leaders, and the media. Spain's "economic miracle" took the shape of the "atomic miracle," only fifteen years after proposing the civil use of the new form of energy and three and a half years after starting construction.
López Bravo, who was already head of the Department of Industry, stated days before the official inauguration of the plant that an increase in electricity production would act as "a vital engine for productive activities for prosperity and well-being" in the conditions of a free market and competition. This meant a "new stage of possibilities" for electric companies to "develop our equipment goods industry" and "create jobs." He declared Zorita to be economically viable. 87 The government imposed the condition that national participation in the plants would not fall below 40 percent, while recommending that the alliance of Spanish groups and foreign firms approach cutting-edge technology projects with guarantees: a method for accelerating the process of learning by doing and the transfer of knowledge. The institutional framework for electricity, which gave priority to private enterprises, was intended to increase investment, coordinate energy planning, train specialists, and exploit the electricity grid. In other words, private companies were chosen to lead the business, which always involved the search for equilibrium between the expectation of benefits and the assumption of risks.
On its own, Zorita satisfied 11.5 percent of the increase in demand for electricity that The uranium cycle that was created for Zorita-at a time when no legislation allowed the AEC to sell enriched uranium to foreign countries in long-term contracts-became the standard for the Spanish industry. In addition, participation in the nuclear project forced the upgrade of the equipment and civil work provided by Spanish firms to a level that was appropriate to match U.S. manufacturing standards. Around Zorita emerged the Spanish nuclear industrial cluster. On the other side of the Atlantic, the Zorita project helped
Americans to understand how to address the Spanish authorities' controls and requirements.
At the same time, the learning curve and technical improvements allowed for better performance for American firms in foreign countries, although the industry's learning process worked better in small plans such as Zorita than in large stations. 91 This is so because a site-built technology such as nuclear power has lower rates of learning and a higher variability of costs than mass-manufactured technologies. 92 Nevertheless, with the construction of the first Spanish atomic plant, firms on both sides of the Atlantic acquired and perfected the specific capabilities required to build a commercial nuclear reactor.
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